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1 INTRODUCTION
In early 2006 nine Eurosystem central banks – 
the national central banks (NCBs) of Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Finland, as well as the European 
Central Bank (ECB) – established a task force 
to analyse and discuss the use of portfolio credit 
risk methodologies by central banks.
The objectives of the task force were threefold. 
The first was to conduct a stock-taking exercise 
as regards current practices at NCBs and the 
ECB. The second followed directly from the 
first: to share views and know-how among 
participants. The third was to develop or agree 
on a “best practice” for central banks on certain 
central bank-specific modelling aspects and 
parameter choices. Two common portfolios 
were analysed by several task force members 
with different systems and the simulation 
results were compared.
This report summarises the findings of the task 
force. It is organised as follows. Section 2 starts 
with a discussion of the relevance of credit risk 
for central banks. It is followed by a short 
introduction to credit risk models, parameters 
and systems in Section 3, focusing on models 
used by members of the task force. Section 4 
presents the results of the simulation exercise 
undertaken by the task force. The lessons from 
these simulations as well as other conclusions 
are discussed in Section 5.
1 INTRODUCTION6
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2  CREDIT RISK IN CENTRAL BANK 
PORTFOLIOS
Credit risk may be defined as the risk of losses 
due to credit events, i.e. default (an obligor 
being unwilling or unable to repay its debt) or 
a change in the quality of the credit (rating 
change). Central banks may be exposed to at 
least two different sources of credit risk. The 
first is related to policy operations: central 
banks lend to commercial banks, with the aim 
of controlling the short-term interest rate. The 
amount may be very sizable: in 2006 the average 
amount lent to commercial banks outstanding 
in the euro area was more than €700 billion. 
The risk, on the other hand, is relatively small, 
since all policy-related lending is collateralised.1 
A central bank risks losing money only in the 
unlikely scenario of a “double default” on the 
part of the counterparty as well as issuer of the 
collateral, or in event of a default by the 
counterparty in combination with a large mark 
to market loss on the collateral. The latter risk 
is mitigated by applying haircuts to the 
collateral. The security from a collateral 
framework is not absolute – nor should it be: 
there is a trade-off between security and costs/
efficiency of monetary policy implementation 
(Bindseil and Papadia, 2006) – but deemed 
sufficient for credit risk from policy operations 
to be disregarded in this report.
The second source of credit risk is investment 
operations. Traditionally, central banks have 
been very conservative investors, with little if 
any appetite for credit risk. Their investment 
portfolios have always been very risky on a 
mark to market basis, though, as a large 
proportion of assets has been denominated in 
foreign currency, and currency risk is typically 
not hedged (it is regarded as “unavoidable”). In 
addition, large gold holdings are subject to 
fluctuations in the price of gold. Compared 
with currency and commodity risks, however, 
other financial risks in the balance sheet – 
including credit and interest rate risk – are 
usually very small. Credit risk is only a minor 
component of overall financial risks, in 
particular at lower confidence levels of common 
risk measures such as value at risk due to credit 
risk (CreditVaR). It becomes more relevant 
when the confidence level is increased, but 
remains much smaller than exchange rate and 
gold price risks.
This relatively limited (perceived) relevance of 
credit risk is changing gradually, for a number 
of reasons.2 First, central bank reserves have 
been growing rapidly in recent years, in 
particular in Asia. Some of these reserves may 
not be directly needed to fulfil public duties 
(e.g. to fund interventions). At the same time, 
central banks are feeling increasing pressure to 
ensure that, within the constraints imposed by 
their public duties and in an environment of 
generally decreased interest rates and lower 
expected returns, an adequate return is 
nonetheless made on these public assets. 
Moreover, as demonstrated in Section 4 of this 
report, even a high credit quality portfolio may 
show a considerable amount of credit risk once 
the confidence level of CreditVaR or other tail 
measures approaches 100%. These observations 
may be used as arguments for transferring 
a proportion of central bank reserves into 
“non-traditional” assets, which offer higher 
expected returns than more traditional central 
bank assets, such as sovereign and supranational 
debt, as well as possibly bonds issued by 
government sponsored enterprises, at little 
additional risk. Some of these newer asset 
classes include asset-backed securities (ABS), 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), corporate 
bonds and, to a lesser extent, equities. A recent 
description of these trends in central bank 
reserves management can be found, for instance, 
in Wooldridge (2006).
1  Article 18.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank requires that 
Eurosystem lending to banks be based on adequate collateral.
2  In one of their annual surveys of reserve management trends, 
Pringle and Carter (2005) observe that “The single most 
important risk facing central banks in 2005 is seen as market 
risk (reflecting expectations of volatility in securities markets 
and exchange rates). However, large central banks view credit 
risk as likely to be equally if not more important for them as 
diversification of asset classes increases their exposure to a 
wider range of borrowers/investments”.7
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The case for corporate bonds in central bank 
portfolios has been put by, among others, de 
Beaufort et al. (2002) and Grava (2004), who 
focus on the attractive risk-return trade-off of 
corporate bonds vis-à-vis government debt. 
Several studies have even argued not only that 
the expected return on corporate bonds is higher 
than the expected return on similar government 
bonds, but that the risk is also lower, as a result 
of negative correlations between spreads and 
the level of interest rates (see, for instance, 
Loeys, 1999). In general, one can argue that in 
most cases adding a small position to an existing 
portfolio should not change the overall risk 
level substantially, and that substituting existing 
assets with newer assets that have lower 
correlations with the rest of the portfolio might 
even reduce the portfolio risk.
Most central banks within the euro area are 
already exposed to credit risk through 
uncollateralised deposits with commercial 
banks, but only a few central banks invest in 
corporate bonds. Several others are, however, 
exploring the possibilities. As credit risk 
exposure grows, central banks must necessarily 
invest time and resources in credit risk 
measurement tools. Value at risk (VaR) models 
for market risk are now common in most, if not 
all, central banks. The introduction of portfolio 
credit risk models is a logical next step, also as 
a precondition for making credit and market 
risks more comparable and for making progress 
towards a more integrated risk management 
approach. In addition, central banks study credit 
risk models for reasons unrelated to their 
investments, notably in their capacity as bank 
supervisors or for market surveillance.
Only a few central banks have practical 
experience with credit risk modelling, but many 
others are testing or implementing systems. Of 
those represented in the task force, three central 
banks have an operational system. Their models 
measure credit risk in all investment portfolios, 
i.e. foreign reserves as well as domestic fixed 
income portfolios. Given the portfolio 
compositions, the scope of the models is 
restricted to fairly “plain vanilla” instruments 
such as bonds, covered bonds, deposits, repos 
and over-the-counter derivative instruments 
such as forwards and swaps (but not yet credit 
default swaps (CDSs)). Government bonds or 
other bonds that are perceived as credit risk-
free are sometimes excluded from the 
calculations.
These models are used for a variety of purposes, 
starting with reporting, typically done on a 
monthly basis. Indirectly, portfolio credit risk 
models are also used for limit setting, for 
instance, if the limit structure is designed in 
such a way that a certain CreditVaR for the 
whole portfolio is not exceeded. Individual 
limits, however, are not derived from a 
CreditVaR. Other applications are limited or 
still at an early stage. Strategic asset allocation 
decisions, for example, are not (yet) based on a 
trade-off between credit and market risk. Risk-
return considerations do play a role, however, 
when assessing the desired allocation to credit. 
One central bank’s decision to invest in 
corporate bonds was motivated by the wish to 
increase portfolio returns by reducing the 
allocation to Treasuries and, hence, avoiding 
paying the liquidity premium embedded in 
Treasury yields. Credit spreads were 
decomposed into compensations for default 
risk and for other risks, in order to identify 
assets with the largest compensation for risks 
other than default (mainly liquidity risk). At the 
time, this compensation was found to be in the 
AA-A range, which is still the bulk of this 
central bank’s portfolio.
The motivation for implementing a portfolio 
credit risk model in those NCBs that do not 
have a model already, is primarily to be able to 
identify and quantify sources of risk and to be 
able to reduce them whenever considered 
necessary. CreditVaR is also expected to 
facilitate the decision-making process 
surrounding benchmarks, investment universe 
and limit system. Another envisaged application 
of a portfolio credit risk model would be in 
stress testing. A precondition is that models are 
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order to be able to communicate output to 
decision makers.
Ultimately, the aim of some of the banks which 
have advanced further in this field, as well as of 
academic research, is to develop a framework 
for integrated risk management, which would 
include market as well as credit risk, and 
possibly also other risks such as liquidity and 
operational risk. The calculation of tail measures 
of credit risk is clearly a first key step in this 
direction, as it provides the same types of risk 
measure as those used typically for market 
risks. In the practice of most task force members, 
there have so far been few concrete attempts to 
integrate market and credit risk models. One 
model permits market and credit risk to be 
combined, using stochastic yield curves. 
Nevertheless, one of the main (and well-known) 
complications of integration is the difference in 
horizon for credit and market risk. Clearly, this 
is an area that is still underdeveloped, in theory 
as well as in practice.9
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3 CREDIT  RISK  MODELS
3.1  OVERVIEW OF CREDIT RISK MODELLING 
ISSUES
In recent years, the literature on credit risk 
modelling has grown tremendously; even a 
concise summary would be well beyond the 
scope of this report. Instead, this section focuses 
on the methodologies used by members of the 
task force and issues of particular relevance to 
central banks. For a comprehensive introduction 
into credit risk modelling, the interested reader 
is referred to one of the standard textbooks, 
including Bluhm et al. (2003), Cossin and 
Pirotte (2007), Duffie and Singleton (2003), 
Lando (2004) or Saunders and Allen (2002), or 
papers such as O’Kane and Schlögl (2001). 
Each of these introduces the topic from a 
slightly different perspective and with its own 
level of (mathematical) complexity. A good 
introduction for practitioners is Ramaswamy 
(2004).
Broadly speaking, credit risk can be quantified 
in default or in migration mode. In default 
mode, the only risk that matters is the risk of 
default. Mark to market losses due to rating 
migrations are not taken into account. For high 
quality portfolios, the credit risk in default 
mode is very low, simply because very few if 
any high quality issuers default within the risk 
horizon, which is typically set at one year. By 
contrast, migration mode deals with all mark to 
market gains and losses due to changes in 
ratings. Default is nothing more than a 
particular, albeit extreme, example of a rating 
migration, and therefore default mode can be 
interpreted as a special case of migration mode. 
Since, empirically, the probability of a rating 
downgrade exceeds the probability of an 
upgrade, and the loss associated with a 
downgrade typically exceeds the gain from an 
upgrade, the calculated credit risk in migration 
mode is usually higher than that in default 
mode.3 The results of Bucay and Rosen (1999) 
for an international bond portfolio seem to 
indicate that in migration mode CreditVaR is 
around 20-40% higher than in default mode, 
although these results depend crucially on the 
nature of the migration matrix (as well as, to a 
lesser extent, the recovery rate, credit spreads 
and the duration of the portfolio). In particular, 
migration matrices such as those derived by 
KMV, now Moody’s KMV, (based on expected 
default frequencies) typically find much higher 
migration probabilities than those computed by 
the rating agencies. Consequently, migration 
risk is more relevant in models that use KMV-
type migration matrices (while spread risk, 
discussed below, is smaller). Most of the models 
implemented or tested by task force members 
operate in migration mode and use migration 
probabilities published by the rating agencies.
A central element of credit risk in migration 
mode is the change in spreads (and, hence, 
prices) as a result of rating migrations. Spreads 
can, however, also fluctuate when ratings 
remain unchanged. Sometimes spread changes 
reflect the usual market volatility and are not 
the result of changes in creditworthiness. This 
risk is known as spread risk. At other times, 
however, spreads may widen, for instance, in 
anticipation of a rating downgrade. This 
situation would clearly reflect credit risk. In 
practice, it is not always possible to distinguish 
between spread risk and credit risk. When 
spreads change for one issuer only, and the rest 
of the market remains unchanged, this is a clear 
indication of credit risk. On the other hand, 
when all spreads change, this may be a reflection 
of normal market volatility. However, a general 
spread widening could also, when the economy 
is deteriorating, reflect an increase in perceived 
probabilities of default or downgrade. Because 
of this definition problem, it is not uncommon 
to refer to all spread changes that do not follow 
rating changes as spread risk, and to consider as 
3  There are, however, technicalities which may partly offset this 
result, for instance the fact that in default mode, the potential 
loss from default may be calculated as the difference between 
the nominal and the recovery value, whereas in migration mode, 
the loss due to a downgrade is computed as the difference in 
market value before and after the downgrade. If the market 
value before downgrade is lower than the nominal value, then 
the loss in migration mode could be smaller than in default 
mode. In practice, these technicalities are small and do not 
change the conclusion that risk in migration mode should be 
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credit risk only those spread changes that are 
the consequence of a rating change. This report 
applies the same distinction and does not focus 
on spread risk.
It is well known that the return distribution of 
credit instruments is very asymmetric (or 
“skewed”) towards losses. This is because 
losses (as a result of defaults or severe 
downgrades) are potentially much larger (but 
have a smaller probability) than gains (yield 
and upgrades). In addition, defaults tend to be 
positively correlated, limiting the possibilities 
of diversification. The return distribution of an 
individual bond that is held until maturity or 
default is binomial. At the portfolio level, 
returns are more symmetric, because losses due 
to downgrades or defaults are partially offset by 
gains from upgrades on other bonds. “Tail 
events” (large losses from defaults) can in most 
cases be avoided through a semi-active approach 
whereby bonds are sold after being downgraded 
below a certain threshold (obviously also at the 
expense of some upside), mirroring the 
composition of an index. However, a small 
probability of a sudden default or downgrade 
remains, and the return distribution is still to 
some extent skewed, as well as fat tailed 
(Chart 1). In order to quantify these risks 
properly, a credit risk model is needed.4
3.2 MODELS  AND  PARAMETER  ASSUMPTIONS 
USED BY TASK FORCE MEMBERS
There are several commercial systems available 
to quantify credit risk, the best known of which 
are probably CreditManager® (based on the 
CreditMetrics™ methodology developed by the 
RiskMetrics Group and formerly J.P. Morgan), 
Portfolio Manager™ (from KMV), CreditRisk+ 
(developed by Credit Suisse Financial Products) 
and CreditPortfolioView (from McKinsey). 
This report focuses on the CreditMetrics™ 
methodology5, since it is used or being tested 
4  Several market participants have argued that the return 
distribution of a well diversified corporate bond index is not 
dissimilar from the return distribution of a government bond 
portfolio. Hence, the index return would be more or less 
symmetric (see, for instance, Loeys, 1999, or Dynkin et al., 
2002) and a special credit risk model might not be needed. This 
symmetry may be hard to achieve in an actual portfolio, 
especially if the market itself is not well diversified (as in the 
euro corporate bond market) since correlations among issuers in 
the same sector are likely to be higher than with issuers in other 
sectors. Moreover, corporate bond indices are typically based 
on market capitalisation, with large exposures to heavily 
indebted companies, further exacerbating downward risks. 
Another argument why returns may be skewed is that it may not 
always be possible to sell a position in a distressed market/
company at an acceptable (market) price. So, even if an index 
return seems fairly symmetric, if it cannot be fully replicated, 
portfolio return may be more skewed in the event that a 
downgraded bond continues to underperform after being 
removed from the index. This “survivorship bias” has been 
studied, among others by Dynkin et al. (2004), who find that 
over a period of observation (January 1990 - September 2003) 
the survivorship bias was small (around 0.5 basis point per 
month) during the first three months after a downgrade, and 
even reversed if the bonds were held longer, reflecting a general 
recovery of downgraded bonds after the initial sell-off. A further 
argument is that, even if the bulk of the distribution appears 
normal, the returns in the tail of the distribution, which are most 
relevant especially to conservative investors such as central 
banks, can still behave far from normally. Finally, symmetry is 
only possible if a significant proportion of the portfolio has 
potential to be upgraded, in order to offset losses from 
downgrades/defaults. A portfolio with AAA issuers only cannot 
be upgraded, and so, even though defaults are highly unlikely, 
its return distribution logically exhibits some skewness.
5  Although the methodologies may superficially seem very 
different, some well-known comparative studies – including 
Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998), Gordy (2000), Crouhy et al. 
(2000) and Kern and Rudolph (2001), all of which compare two 
or more of the main commercially available models – find 
similarities among them. Note that several of the (earliest 
versions of the) models operate in default mode only, and that, 
as a result, some of the comparisons examined the default 
component of credit risk only.
Chart 1 Comparison of typical market and 
credit returns
Note: The distributions have identical expected returns. The 
credit return has more probability mass in the left tail, whereas 
its upside is limited. Due to the (assumed) symmetry of the 
market return, the chart suggests that the upside of market 
returns is higher than of credit returns. This is only true for 
certain types of “market instruments”, such as equities; it is not 
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by most central banks participating in the task 
force, either directly, using the CreditManager® 
software, or through in-house systems 
(developed in Matlab® or Excel®) using a 
similar methodology. The popularity of 
CreditManager® and its methodology is due to 
a combination of factors: ease and documentation 
of the methodology, quality and user-friendliness 
of the software, the reputation of the RiskMetrics 
Group and familiarity with some of its other 
products, and sometimes also cost 
considerations.
The introduction in this section is largely based 
on the original Technical Document (Gupton et 
al., 1997), even though the methodology has 
been updated and improved since then. The 
CreditMetrics™ methodology can be classified 
as a ratings-based (migration) approach, 
combined with a structural correlation model. 
Monte Carlo simulation techniques are applied 
to generate credit loss distributions. To 
understand the CreditMetrics™ methodology at 
the portfolio level, it is best to start with an 
individual bond. Consider a bond rated A. In 
order to generate a loss distribution for this 
bond over a certain horizon, CreditMetrics™ 
uses rating migration probabilities such as those 
regularly published by the rating agencies. It 
draws random numbers (asset returns) from a 
standard normal distribution, which are 
transformed into simulated ratings at the end of 
the horizon, in such a way that the migration 
probabilities in the simulation match the 
historically observed rating migration 
probabilities that are used as inputs to the 
model. This process is illustrated in Chart 2.
As long as the randomly generated asset return 
is between the thresholds zBBB and zAA, the 
simulated rating remains unchanged, but when 
a threshold is exceeded, the rating changes (up 
or down, depending on the threshold). 
Thresholds are set in such a way that the 
simulated migration probabilities are equal to 
the empirical (input) probabilities. For instance, 
if the historical probability of an upgrade to 
AAA is 1%, then the threshold is set at 2.326 
(since Pr(X > 2.326) = 0.01 for a standard 
normal random variable X). On the basis of the 
simulated rating, the bond is repriced from the 
relevant forward curve. This process is repeated 
many times. Two observations are crucial. First, 
even though asset returns are drawn from a 
normal distribution, ratings and therefore bond 
prices are not. Second, for individual bonds, 
simulation is not really needed, since (in the 
limit) the simulated rating distribution equals 
the empirical (input) distribution. The example 
here merely serves to introduce the methodology 
at the portfolio level, where simulation 
techniques are needed to generate correlated 
migrations.
A similar procedure is applied to portfolios 
which consist of more than one obligor, but 
with the additional complexity that asset returns 
and therefore rating migrations are correlated. 
Uncorrelated random returns need to be 
transformed into correlated returns, which can 
be done in a number of ways. A well-known 
technique, available in CreditManager®, is 
based on the Cholesky decomposition of the 
correlation matrix.6 The normal distribution of 
asset returns is merely used for convenience – 
6  A correlation matrix Σ is decomposed into an upper triangle and 
a lower triangle matrix L in such a way that Σ = LLT. A vector 
of uncorrelated random returns xu is transformed into a vector 
of correlated returns xc = Lxu. It is easy to see that xc has zero 





xx L xxL () = () = () == = Lx xLL I LL L E uu
TT T TΣ, as 
desired. Since correlation matrices are symmetric and (in 
theory) positive-definite, the Cholesky decomposition can be 
computed.
Chart 2 Asset value and migration
zD zCCC zB zBB zBBB zAA zAAA
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correlation is the only determinant of co-
dependence – but in theory it is also possible to 
use alternative probability distributions for 
asset returns. These, however, increase the 
complexity of the model. Sampling from 
Student-t distributions, for example, allows 
higher tail dependence. Lucas et al. (2001) find 
that the choice of distribution has significant 
consequences for the credit loss quantiles, 
especially far in the tails. Note that using 
default correlation directly (rather than asset 
correlation) poses several difficulties, aside 
from the usual measurement problems and lack 
of data. Lucas (2004) illustrates why pairwise 
default correlations are insufficient to quantify 
credit risk in portfolios consisting of three 
assets or more. This is a consequence of the 
discrete nature of defaults.
Under the CreditMetrics™ methodology, credit 
risk is independent from market (spread) risk. 
This is because spreads are constant and derived 
from forward curves. Most members of the task 
force follow the standard CreditManager® set-
up; in-house models sometimes rest on 
somewhat simplifying assumptions. The 
approach can be simplified to default mode 
only, and the number of “ratings” is reduced to 
two (default/no default only). This may be 
useful when quantifying the credit risk for non-
tradable assets such as deposits, for which 
migrations and marking to market are less 
relevant. Some central banks have “upgraded” 
their models from default to migration mode 
fairly recently. One has been testing credit risk 
models primarily in default mode but has 
applied migration mode for the simulation 
exercise in Section 4.
In order to generate reliable estimates of risk 
(tail) measures, a large number of simulations 
are needed. The number can be greatly reduced 
using variance reduction techniques such as 
importance sampling, which is especially suited 
to rare event simulations. Importance sampling 
is based on the idea that one is really only 
concerned with the tail of the distribution, and 
will therefore sample more observations from 
the tail than from the rest of the distribution. 
With importance sampling, the original 
distribution from which observations are drawn 
is changed into a distribution which increases 
the likelihood that “important” observations are 
drawn. These observations are then weighted 
by the likelihood ratio to ensure that estimates 
are unbiased. The challenge is finding a good 
transformation of the original distribution, 
which is an art as well as a science. For a normal 
distribution this transformation is technically 
straightforward and involves shifting the mean 
(and sometimes also scaling the variance). 
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CreditManager® also uses importance sampling. 
A good reference is Glasserman (2005).
Several task force members reported that 
importance sampling can reduce the number of 
simulations and, hence, computation time, by a 
factor of 10 or more. However, it was also noted 
that the likelihood ratio, which adjusts the 
likelihood of the drawn outcomes to reflect 
their likelihood under the original distribution, 
can be unstable, thus reducing the accuracy of 
simulation results. Most of the results presented 
in Section 4 are derived from 100,000 to 
200,000 simulated scenarios with importance 
sampling, which can be completed on most 
computers in a reasonable amount of time 
(typically a few minutes using CreditManager®). 
In practice, the number of draws needed to 
reach a certain precision depends crucially on 
the composition of the portfolio as well as the 
chosen confidence level.
The CreditMetrics™ framework is summarised 
in the well-known Chart 3. More details can be 
found in its Technical Document (Gupton et al., 
1997). The following sub-sections discuss key 
parameters in CreditMetrics™ and related 
methodologies.
3.2.1 PROBABILITIES OF DEFAULT/MIGRATION
It is important to realise that CreditMetrics™ is 
not a methodology to estimate probabilities of 
default (PDs). Instead, these probabilities, 
together with migration probabilities, are 
important input parameters, usually obtained 
from one of the major rating agencies, which 
publish updated migration matrices frequently.7 
The migration matrices from different rating 
agencies are all fairly similar for any given 
industry. Each of the three major rating agencies 
is used by at least one of the task force members, 
sometimes mixing migration matrices from 
different sources. One central bank uses default 
probabilities discussed in Ramaswamy (2004), 
which are based on Moody’s data. All measure 
probabilities over a one-year horizon.
Rating migration probabilities have their 
limitations, in particular for central banks 
whose portfolios are dominated by highly rated 
sovereign issuers. It is well-known that default 
and migration probabilities for sovereign 
issuers are different from probabilities for 
corporate issuers. Comparing, for instance, the 
latest updates of migration probabilities by 
Standard & Poor’s (2007a and 2007b) reveals 
that while, historically since 1981, a few AA 
and A corporate issuers have defaulted over a 
one-year horizon (with frequencies equal to 1 
and 6 basis points respectively, see Table 13 of 
S&P 2007a), not a single investment grade 
(i.e. down to BBB) sovereign issuer has ever 
defaulted over a one-year horizon (based on 
observations since 1975, see Table 1 of S&P 
2007b). Even after ten years, A or better rated 
sovereign issuers did not default (Table 5 of 
S&P 2007b). While these are comforting results, 
one should also be aware that they are based on 
a limited number of observations. Hence, their 
statistical significance may be questioned. 
Moreover, the rating agencies themselves 
acknowledge that rating sovereign issuers is 
considerably more complex and subjective than 
rating corporate issuers.
7  Default and migration probabilities can also be (and often are) 
estimated from structural and reduced form models, among 
others. Structural models are based on the work of Merton 
(1974), and apply the logic that equity represents a call option 
on a firm’s assets. Debt can be modelled as a short put option, 
and so option pricing techniques can be applied to value debt 
and estimate the probability of default. The value of assets is 
represented by a stochastic process (typically geometric 
Brownian motion, whereby logarithmic changes in the asset 
value are normally distributed), based on the assumption that a 
firm defaults if the value of its assets falls below (the nominal 
value of) its liabilities. The best known application of this 
model was developed by KMV, which links “expected default 
frequency” and “distance to default” to risk-neutral default 
probabilities. An advantage of structural models over other 
models is that they can help explain why a company is likely to 
default. They are, however, less suitable for sovereign issuers 
or private companies, since the volatility of equity prices is 
often used to estimate asset volatility. Reduced form models, by 
contrast, do not try to explain why a firm defaults but exploit 
information from bond markets to calculate default probabilities 
or, more precisely, the expected time until default. Default is 
treated as an unexpected event, the likelihood of which is 
governed by a default-intensity process. The default intensity 
measures the conditional likelihood that an issuer will default 
over the next small interval of time, given that it has not yet 
defaulted. The parameter (intensity or hazard rate) of this 
process can be estimated from credit spreads. The simplest 
example of this approach uses a Poisson process, whereby the 
time until default is exponentially distributed. Reduced form 
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As a result, investors, including central banks, 
often use migration probabilities derived from 
corporate issuers, which leads to conservative 
but probably more robust risk estimates. But 
even corporate default probabilities over a one-
year horizon are historically equal or close to 
zero for the highest ratings. Since it seems 
reasonable to assume that the “true” probabilities 
are somewhat higher, even for AAA-rated 
issuers, it is not uncommon for these default 
probabilities to be adjusted upwards by a few 
basis points (and for one or more other migration 
probabilities to be reduced by the same amount). 
In the absence of better alternatives, this is 
often done in a rather ad hoc manner. A 
promising approach, recently proposed by Pluto 
and Tasche (2006), that derives confidence 
intervals for PDs, taking into account the 
number of observations, has not yet found its 
way to the models used by market participants 
and task force members.
Task force members apply various adjustments 
that assign a positive PD to the highest ratings 
while still respecting the ranking of ratings (i.e. 
the PD for a AA obligor should be higher than 
the PD for AAA, etc.). For AAA-rated issuers, 
the PD is set in the range 0-1 basis point; for 
AA, it is in the range 0-4 basis points. Note that 
the upper bounds correspond to the “normalised” 
PDs in Ramaswamy (2004, Exhibit 5.4, where 
the 4 basis points is applied to Aa3/AA–). The 
levels are, however, not based on any empirical 
evidence; they are merely introduced as a 
pragmatic solution to allow default correlations 
to be estimated directly. Sometimes a higher 
PD is assumed for corporate issuers than for 
government issuers with the same rating. For 
example, one task force member assumes that 
the PD for sovereign and supranational issuers 
is half that of the PD for corporate issuers with 
the same rating.
Clearly, the accuracy of the migration 
probabilities published by the rating agencies is 
crucial. Their methodology for estimating these 
probabilities can be described as statistical: the 
main technique, the “cohort” approach, simply 
counts the number of migrations for a given 
rating within a calendar year and divides this 
number by the total number of obligors with the 
initial rating. 
Default probabilities for short horizons
An interesting and highly relevant problem, 
particularly for central bank portfolios with low 
durations, is how to compute default probabilities 
for short horizons. When assets mature before the 
end of the risk horizon (typically one year), then 
it obviously matters how the expected cash flow 
at maturity is reinvested. If it were invested in a 
similar asset from the same obligor at all times, 
even after a downgrade, then the risk would be 
identical to a one-year investment. Sometimes 
this may be a realistic assumption, for instance 
when a strong relationship with the obligor 
outweighs increased counterparty risks. It is, 
however, more common that after a downgrade 
beyond a certain threshold the cash from the 
matured asset is reinvested elsewhere. Hence, 
CreditMetrics™ assumes that matured assets are 
held in risk-less cash until the end of the horizon. 
In these cases, the risk of the short maturity asset 
is lower than the risk of a longer-term position in 
the same obligor, and it is necessary to scale 
default probabilities to short horizons. Note that 
migration risk is irrelevant for instruments with 
a maturity less than the horizon, since time is 
assumed to be discrete and positions can only 
change at the end of the horizon.
Scaling default probabilities to short horizons 
can be done in several ways. The easiest 
approach is to assume that the conditional PD 
(or “hazard rate” in reduced form models) is 
constant over time. The only information 
needed from the migration matrix is the right-
hand column which contains the probabilities 
of default over the risk horizon. Assuming the 
risk horizon is one year, then for each rating the 
probabilities of default pd(t) for a shorter 
horizon t < 1 follow directly from the one-year 
probabilities pd(1) using the formula pd(t) = 1 
– [1 – pd(1)]t.8 This is approximately equal to 
8  This is the discrete-time equivalent of reduced form models 
with a constant hazard rate (conditional probability of default) 
λ, where the probability of default over a period t is given by 
1 – e–λt. From pd(1) = 1 – e–λ, it follows that λ = – ln[1 – pd(1)], 
and therefore that pd(t) = 1 – [1 – pd(1)]t.15
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pd(1) × t. Note that this would be a logical 
procedure in default mode.
Alternatively, one may use all the information 
embedded in the migration matrix, taking into 
account that default probabilities are not 
constant over time but increase as a result of 
downgrades. Ideally, if M is the one-year 
migration matrix, and one is interested in one-
month probabilities of default, a one-month 
migration matrix G is needed, such that G12 = M. 
Essentially, this involves computing the root 
of the migration matrix. Finding this root 
requires the computation of eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors. Any n × n matrix has n (not 
necessarily distinct) eigenvalues and 
corresponding eigenvectors. If the matrix is 
symmetric, then all eigenvalues are real. If C is 
the matrix of eigenvectors and Λ is the matrix 
with eigenvalues on the diagonal and all other 
elements equal to zero, then any symmetric 
matrix M can be written as M = CΛC–1 (where 
C–1 denotes the inverse of matrix C). In special 
cases, a non-symmetric square matrix (such as 
a migration matrix) can be decomposed in the 
same way. The square root of the matrix follows 
from M1/2 = CΛ1/2C–1. Migration matrices for 
shorter periods are found analogously. The 
computation of the root is based on the 
Markovian property of migration matrices, 
which means that rating migrations are path-
independent and the probabilities are constant 
over time. This is a very common assumption, 
used by many, despite empirical evidence to the 
contrary (see, for instance, Nickell et al., 
2000).
The root of a matrix can only be computed if all 
of its eigenvalues are non-negative. The 
eigenvalues of a migration matrix are in practice 
usually positive – although there is no guarantee 
that they always will be – because migration 
matrices are diagonally dominant (i.e. the 
largest probabilities in each row are on the 
diagonal). A more serious problem, however, is 
that some of the eigenvectors can have negative 
elements and generate a root matrix which also 
has negative elements. Clearly, in such cases, 
the root is no longer a valid migration matrix. 
In fact, it can be shown that if there are ratings 
r1 and r2 such that r2 is accessible from r1, while 
the probability of migrating from r1 to r2 in a 
single period is zero, then the root is not a valid 
migration matrix (Kreinin and Sidelnikova, 
2001). Unfortunately, this is precisely the 
structure of most migration matrices that are 
based on empirical data, as the one-period PD 
for AAA is typically zero, while the probability 
over longer periods is clearly higher.
Note that a transformation is only needed if the 
horizon of default probabilities exceeds the 
maturity of the shortest asset in the portfolio. 
Clearly, it would be more efficient to estimate 
short horizon PDs directly from a ratings 
database. This can be done in discrete as well 
as in continuous time. In the limit, as the time 
interval approaches zero, migration probabilities 
can be represented by a generator matrix G, 
from which the actual migration probabilities 
over horizon t are derived by computing the 
matrix exponential exp(t × G) (Lando and 
Skødeberg, 2002). The estimation of generator 
matrices takes into account the exact timing of 
each rating migration and therefore uses more 
information than traditional approaches. A 
positive spin-off of using generator matrices is 
that they normally also generate positive 
probabilities of default for the highest rated 
issuers, so that fewer manual (and arbitrary) 
adjustments are needed. They do not solve the 
limited data availability as regards sovereign 
issuers, however. Generator matrices are not 
(yet) very common in practice.
If the root of the migration matrix does not 
exist, or if it is not a valid migration matrix, 
then an approximation is needed for the PD 
over short horizons. The central banks 
participating in the task force use various 
approximations for this. A standard approach in 
CreditManager® is to “scale down” the annual 
PDs linearly, for example the one-month PD is 
set equal to the annual probability divided by 
12. As noted before, this approach is 
approximately equal to the “true” formula in 
default mode. The approach is used by several 
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or is not a valid migration matrix. One central 
bank transforms maturities into multiples of 
three months and uses the adjusted maturity to 
compute the PD. Another assumes that any 
asset which matures before the end of the 
horizon is rolled into a similar asset, which 
implies that the PD of a short duration asset 
equals the one-year PD. One task force member 
has recently started computing the “closest 
three-month matrix generator” to the one-year 
matrix. This generator is calculated numerically 
by minimising the sum of the squared differences 
between the original one-year migration 
probabilities and the one-year probabilities 
generated by the three-month matrix. This 
three-month matrix provides plausible estimates 
of the short-term migration probabilities and 
will normally also generate small but positive 
one-year default probabilities for highly rated 
issuers.
It seems fair to say that, by most standards, all 
of these approximations lead to conservative 
estimates of the “true” short-term PD. In the 
structural models of default, for instance, the 
stochastic properties of the asset value imply a 
probability that is very close to zero over short 
horizons, since a “jump” in the asset value is 
not possible and time passes before the default 
threshold is reached with any significant 
probability. In the reduced form models, default 
is an unforeseeable event and so will have a 
positive probability even over shorter horizons, 
but, unless very unusual parameter choices are 
made, the probability will not be higher than 
the probabilities assumed above.
In reality, the conservative estimates of default 
probabilities find some justification in the fact 
that most central banks, like any other 
investment grade investor, sell a bond once it 
has been downgraded beyond a certain 
threshold. This reduces the actual PD, but its 
impact cannot be addressed directly by single-
step models, which do not allow selling before 
the end of the horizon. One member of the task 
force has adopted a multi-step approach, 
whereby 12 monthly sub-periods are simulated 
and the model allows downgraded bonds to be 
sold at the end of each sub-period.
3.2.2 CORRELATION
Probabilities of default and migration are key 
risk parameters as regards individual obligors, 
together with recovery rates, which will be 
discussed in the next sub-section. At the 
portfolio level, correlation is crucial. Under 
certain assumptions, the PD and correlation 
determine the entire loss distribution of a credit-
risky portfolio.9 Correlation is, however, also 
the parameter that is most difficult to estimate. 
Correlation measures the extent to which assets 
default or migrate together. In the credit risk 
literature, the parameter often (but loosely) 
referred to is default correlation, formally 
defined as the correlation between default 
indicators (1 for default, 0 for non-default) over 
some period of time, typically one year. Default 
correlation can be either positive – for instance 
because firms in the same industry are exposed 
to the same suppliers or raw materials, or 
because firms in one country are exposed to the 
same exchange rate – or negative, when for 
example the elimination of a competitor 
increases a company’s market share. Default 
correlation is difficult to estimate directly, 
simply because defaults, let alone correlated 
defaults, are rare events. It is also, as mentioned 
before, difficult to apply in practice. For these 
reasons, CreditMetrics™ (and many other 
models) estimates correlations of asset returns 
rather than of defaults.
CreditMetrics™ uses equity returns as a proxy 
for asset returns, which cannot be observed 
directly or only infrequently. This is a common 
approach, used by many others. Rather than 
using one uniform asset correlation, 
CreditMetrics™ allows a factor model to be 
used for correlations. The model is estimated 
9  A well-known result by Vasicek (1991) is that the cumulative 
loss distribution of an infinitely granular portfolio in default 
mode (no recovery) is in the limit equal to:
  Fx N
NxNp d () =










 where  ρ is the (positive) asset correlation and N(x) represents 
the cumulative standard normal distribution evaluated at x (N–1 
being its inverse).17
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on equity indices, with individual obligors 
“mapped” onto countries and sectors. Because 
of uncertainties and strong assumptions in the 
computation, CreditManager® also allows users 
to select their own, possibly uniform, asset 
correlations.
It is important to note that asset and default 
correlation are very different concepts. Default 
correlation is related non-linearly to asset 
correlation and tends to be considerably lower 
(in absolute value).10 While Basel II, for 
instance, proposes an asset correlation of up to 
24%11, default correlation is normally only a 
few percent. Indeed, Lucas (2004) demonstrates 
that, for default correlation, the full range of 
–1 to +1 is only attainable under very special 
circumstances. Chart 4 below illustrates the 
range of possible default correlations for a 
given asset correlation (30%). Note that, for a 
given level of asset correlation, default 
correlation is a (generally increasing) function 
of the individual probabilities of default.
Other things being equal, risks become more 
concentrated as asset correlations increase, and 
the probability of multiple defaults or 
downgrades rises. With perfect correlation 
among all obligors, a portfolio behaves as a 
single bond. It should thus come as no surprise 
that the relationship between asset correlation 
and credit risk is positive (and non-linear). 
Chart 5 plots this relationship, using expected 
shortfall (see Section 3.3) as the risk measure, 
for a hypothetical portfolio.
In practice, it is not possible to estimate and use 
individual correlations for each pair of obligors. 
First of all, scarcity of data limits the scope 
for estimating correlations, and second, the 
large number of correlations (n (n – 1) / 2  for  a 
portfolio of n obligors) makes this approach 
untenable. Instead, it is common to use industry 
and country correlations, or simply to assume 
one uniform correlation. Task force members 
use various asset correlations when computing 
CreditVaR. Several use a fixed and uniform 
correlation equal or very close to the Basel II 
level of 24%. Others prefer the CreditMetrics™ 
factor model, which maps obligors to one or 
more country and industry indices and estimates 
asset correlations from equity indices, because 
3 CREDIT 
RISK MODELS
10  The formal relationship between asset and default correlation 
depends on the joint distribution of the asset returns. For 
normally distributed asset returns, the relationship is given by 
equations 8.5 and 8.6 in the CreditMetrics™ Technical 
Document.
11 Under the internal ratings-based approach of Basel II, the 
formula for calculating risk-weighted assets is based on an 













50 . Notice that ρ decreases as pd increases, which
  seems to contradict Chart 4. Note, however, that Chart 4 plots 
default correlation (for a given asset correlation), whereas the 
Basel II formula computes asset correlation.
Chart 4 Range of possible default 
correlations for a given asset correlation 
(30%)
Source: CreditMetrics™ Technical Document.
Chart 5 Impact of asset correlation on 
portfolio risk
(hypothetical portfolio with 100 issuers rated AAA-A, 
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it captures diversification effects between 
industries and countries. Note that this approach 
has its limitations for central bank portfolios, 
which mainly consist of bonds issued by 
(unlisted) governments. An approximation used 
maps the government issuer to a broad country 
equity index and estimates the R2 with a general 
(i.e. world) index. While the magnitude of 
correlations in the CreditMetrics™ factor 
model obviously depends on the portfolio 
composition, they tend to be larger than 24% in 
a typical central bank portfolio dominated by 
government and other AAA bonds. In fact, some 
correlations are considered high enough to 
justify setting them at a discretionary (and 
conservative) level of 100%.
3.2.3 RECOVERY RATES
The recovery rate measures the proportion of 
the principal value (and possibly accrued 
interest) that is recovered in the event of a 
default. The recovery rate depends on, among 
other things, the seniority of a loan. For 
simplicity, the recovery rate is often assumed to 
be constant across (types of) issuers and issues. 
More sophisticated approaches use stochastic 
recovery rates (typically using a beta 
distribution), possibly even correlated with 
default/migration probabilities. Clearly, the 
impact of the recovery rate on estimated losses 
is significant, particularly in default mode. 
Well-known empirical studies into recovery 
rates are from Asarnow and Edwards (1995), 
Carty and Lieberman (1996), Altman and 
Kishore (1996), and Altman, Resti and Sironi 
(2005). Rating agencies also publish studies on 
recovery rates regularly.
The members of the task force use several 
alternative assumptions for the recovery rate. 
Some are taken from papers mentioned in the 
CreditMetrics™ Technical Document (which 
are among those cited above). When a fixed 
recovery rate is used, it is typically set in the 
range 40-50% for senior bonds. Also, the mean 
is in this range when a stochastic recovery rate 
is modelled. One example is a stochastic 
recovery rate with a beta distribution with a 
mean of 48% and standard deviation of 26% 
(for senior unsecured bonds). It was mentioned 
that when recovery rates from CreditManager® 
are used, typically the most conservative levels 
are selected.
Recently, more evidence has emerged that 
recovery rates for bank loans are on average 
substantially higher than for bonds. In response, 
Moody’s (2004) announced a revision of its 
rating methodology, which is based on expected 
losses. S&P ratings, by contrast, are based on 
PDs and do not take into account recovery 
rates.
A related concept is that of the exposure at 
default, which may be different from the current 
exposure as a result of market movements or 
accrued interest. In CreditMetrics™, exposure 
at default is deterministic; in practice, one may 
use the current exposure (possibly plus an add-
on) or the expected exposure at the investment 
horizon. One system can also generate stochastic 
yield curves, but concepts such as potential 
future exposure are not (yet) used. Long and 
short positions versus individual counterparties 
are sometimes netted.
Some participants consolidate exposures to 
related counterparties at the group level, and 
assume that the PD of the group equals the PD 
of the member with the lowest rating. Sometimes 
counterparties with close links are connected 
indirectly. As many branches don’t have 
individual ratings, limits are assigned at the 
group level.
3.2.4 YIELDS/SPREADS
The final parameter, which is only needed in 
migration mode, is the (forward) spread in 
yields or (zero-coupon) interest rates. This 
determines the mark to market loss (gain) in the 
event of a downgrade (upgrade). In essence, a 
bond that is downgraded is repriced against the 
curve for the new rating, and the credit loss is 
approximately equal to the spread widening 
multiplied by the modified duration. The quality 
of the spread is thus crucial for the quantification 
of credit risk under migration mode. Finding 
reliable data may be a challenge, in particular 19
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for lower ratings and certain currencies. A 
certain “smoothness” in the spreads is desired, 
to avoid a bias in simulation results due to a few 
outliers in bond prices/yields. For this, a large 
number of curve fitting techniques are available; 
see Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
(2005) for an overview. An issue for central 
banks with short duration portfolios is that the 
quality of the spreads at the short end of the 
curve is more important than the quality at the 
long end.
The CreditMetrics™ Technical Document is 
not very specific as regards its curve 
methodology, although it mentions various data 
contributors and serious efforts to ensure 
accuracy and consistency of curves and spreads. 
Some recent publications by the RiskMetrics 
Group shed more light on how this may be 
done. Stamicar (2007) discusses a “spread 
overhaul”, largely based on the Hull-White 
framework (see Hull and White, 2000), which 
harmonises methodologies across RiskMetrics 
products. Rather than using spreads directly to 
reprice assets upon rating migrations, this 
framework derives term structures of risk-
neutral default probabilities for each rating 
from either bond or equity prices or from CDS 
spreads.12 Together with the risk-free rate, these 
probabilities are an alternative way to price 
each bond in the portfolio. Hazard rates 
3 CREDIT 
RISK MODELS
12 The intuition behind risk-neutral default probabilities comes 
from option pricing and risk-neutral valuation. The price P of a 
credit-risky bond with maturity t can be obtained in two ways. 
The first, traditional approach derives the present value of all 
cash flows, discounted at the relevant rate. Assuming, for 
simplicity, only one cash flow at time t, the price is given by 
P = [pd × RR + (1 – pd) × N] / (1 + rf + s)t, where pd is the actual 
probability of default, RR is the recovery rate, N is the principal 
(+ interest), rf is the risk-free rate and s is the spread (“risk 
premium”).
  Alternatively, the price may also be computed as P = [q × RR + 
(1 – q) × N] / (1 + rf)t. Here, q is the risk-neutral default 
probability. Note that the spread or risk premium is omitted 
from the denominator. Since the price is given, it follows that 
q > pd: risk-neutral default probabilities are (much) larger than 
actual default probabilities.
Table 1 Summary of key parameters in CreditVaR models
CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5
PD/migration Source: Moody’s, 
PD adjusted upwards 
for AAA, AA and A




upwards for AAA 
and possibly lower 
ratings, different 




PD adjusted upwards 
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Source: S&P, 
PD adjusted upwards 




Timing of default 
uniformly 
distributed across 
the year (e.g. annual 
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quarterly PD, 
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Monthly PD based 
on assumption of 
constant conditional 
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Correlation Asset correlation 










factor model based 
on correlation of 
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fixed at 24% 
Recovery rate Fixed or variable; 
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based on study by 
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(conditional risk-neutral PDs) and forward 
risk-free rates are assumed to be constant 
between adjacent curve notes, which has an 
effect similar to imposing smoothness on 
spreads directly through some curve fitting 
technique. Here, it suffices to note that the 
“overhaul” has little impact on plain vanilla 
instruments typically used in central bank 
portfolios, but that it may improve accuracy for 
more complex structured products. Using credit 
spreads directly is therefore still a valid 
approach.
The spreads used by task force members are 
obtained from either CreditManager® directly 
or from Bloomberg and Reuters. One member 
tests CreditVaR in default mode, but plans to 
extend the model to include migration risk.
The main parameter choices of task force 
members using or implementing CreditVaR 
models are summarised in Table 1, where CB1 
to CB5 refer to the five central banks with 
models that have been implemented or are being 
implemented.
3.3 OUTPUT
Typical output from credit risk models includes 
expected and unexpected loss, (Credit) value at 
risk (in the remainder of this report simply 
referred to as VaR, unless confusion with other 
types of risk could arise) and expected shortfall 
(ES) (Chart 6). Expected and unexpected losses 
are the first and second moments (mean and 
standard deviation) of the loss distribution and 
can be calculated analytically. Expected 
portfolio loss is simply equal to the weighted 
average of expected losses on individual 
positions. The analytical computation of 
unexpected loss is more cumbersome and 
involves correlations. Sometimes it is more 
efficient to derive unexpected loss by simulation. 
Strictly speaking, expected loss is not a risk 
measure, since risk is by definition restricted to 
unexpected events.
Like VaR for market risks, CreditVaR is defined 
as a certain quantile of the credit loss 
distribution. It measures the loss that is not 
exceeded at a given confidence level over a 
given time period. In other words, it is the 
minimum loss that may be suffered with a 
certain probability. In credit risk modelling, it 
is common to refer to VaR as the loss in excess 
of the expected loss. Expected shortfall, 
sometimes also referred to as conditional VaR 
or expected tail loss, measures the loss in the 
tail of the distribution, conditional on the fact 
that the loss exceeds the VaR. It can be 
calculated as the average VaR at higher 
confidence levels, and is therefore equal to the 
average loss with a certain probability. In 
Chart 6, ES is represented by the surface under 
the distribution to the left of the VaR.
It is often argued that ES is more appropriate 
than VaR for the analysis of rare events (such 
as default). CreditVaR is typically also computed 
at higher confidence levels than VaR for market 
risk. This is because issuers with an external 
rating need to have very low probabilities of 
default if they aim for a high rating. If, for 
instance, a bank aims at a single-A rating, 
corresponding roughly to a PD of 10 basis 
points, then it should calculate its VaR at a 
99.9% confidence level to determine its capital 
needs. The same confidence level is used in the 
Basel II formulas for the internal ratings-based 
approach for credit risk, whereas “only” a 99% 
confidence level is applied to determine the 
capital requirements for market risk (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006).
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In addition, the use of VaR is increasingly 
criticised because VaR is not a coherent risk 
measure (Artzner at al., 1999)13, since it is not 
necessarily sub-additive. This means that it is 
possible to construct two portfolios, A and B, 
such that VaR(A + B) > VaR(A) + VaR(B). In 
other words, the VaR of a combined portfolio 
may exceed the sum of the individual VaRs, 
thus discouraging diversification. Naturally, a 
risk measure that rewards diversification would 
be preferable. The sub-additivity problem is 
particularly acute for portfolios with fat-tailed 
or discrete return distributions, such as credit-
risky portfolios. By contrast, it can be shown 
that ES is always sub-additive, and also satisfies 
all other properties of coherent risk measures. 
Nevertheless, in communication to senior 
management, VaR still plays a pivotal role, as 
it is clearer and more comprehensible than ES. 
Moreover, any risk measure that tries to capture 
the whole loss distribution in a single number, 
whether it is VaR or ES, has its limitations. It 
therefore makes sense to analyse several risk 
measures at the same time, or in fact use the full 
return distribution. Finally, it is noted that in 
the limit, as the confidence level is increased to 
very high levels, VaR and ES converge. To 
understand why, note that at a confidence level 
of 100%, all issuers with a positive PD default, 
and the VaR as well as ES are equal to the loss 
given default.
CreditManager® and the other systems 
mentioned compute all of these risk measures. 
CreditManager® offers two definitions of 
expected loss, both of which are computed 
analytically. The first (“expected loss” in 
CreditManager®) is equal to the difference 
between the portfolio value at the start of the 
simulation (“current value” in CreditManager® 
terminology) and the average portfolio value 
(over all scenarios) at the end of the simulation 
horizon (“mean horizon value”). The other 
definition (“expected loss from horizon value”) 
equals “horizon value” (if the rating stays the 
same) minus “mean horizon value”. The 
difference between the two definitions is that 
the first is “biased” by interest returns, and can 
actually be a net gain if default and downgrade 
probabilities are small. Hence, all task force 
members using CreditManager® prefer the 
second definition. Those who do not use 
CreditManager® derive expected loss by 
simulation and use somewhat different 
definitions, one of which resembles the first 
CreditManager® definition.
Other risk measures used by task force members 
include unexpected loss (UL, “standard 
deviation of horizon value” in CreditManager®), 
VaR (including incremental VaR) and ES at 
various confidence levels. All of these are 




13  A risk measure is said to be coherent if it satisfies the four 
properties of sub-additivity, (positive) homogeneity, 
monotonicity and translation invariance.22
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4 SIMULATION  EXERCISE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The core of this report consists in the analysis 
of several simulation exercises with the aim of 
comparing results and quantifying, albeit 
roughly, the sensitivity of output to changes in 
parameters. To this end, two very different 
portfolio have been analysed. The first portfolio 
(in the following “Portfolio I”) is a subset of 
the aggregate ECB US dollar portfolio, as it 
existed some time ago. The portfolio contains 
government bonds, bonds issued by the BIS, 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and 
supranational institutions, all rated AAA/Aaa, 
and short-term deposits with 32 different 
counterparties rated A or higher and with an 
assumed maturity of one month. Hence, the 
credit risk of the portfolio is expected to be low. 
The modified duration of the portfolio is low.
The other portfolio (“Portfolio II”) is fictive. It 
contains 62 (mainly private) issuers, spread 
across regions, sectors, ratings as well as 
maturities. It is still relatively “chunky”, in the 
sense that the six largest issues make up almost 
50% of the portfolio, but otherwise more 
diversified than Portfolio I. It has a higher 
modified duration than Portfolio I. The lowest 
rating is B+/B1. Chart 7 compares the 
composition of the two portfolios, by rating as 
well as by sector (the sector “banking” includes 
positions in GSEs). From the upper chart 
(distribution by rating), one would expect 
Portfolio II to be more risky.
Five task force members participated in the 
simulation exercise. It is recalled that not all 
had already fully implemented a portfolio credit 
risk system. Most participants in the simulation 
exercise analysed the portfolios using at least 
two sets of parameters, a common set to be used 
by all participants and one or more sets of 
individual model parameters. Simulation results 
were reported using a common template, which 
included, among other things, the following 
risk measures: expected loss, unexpected loss,
VaR and ES, at various confidence levels and 
all for a one-year investment horizon. In 
addition, the probability of at least one default 
was computed by some participants, since a 
default might have reputational consequences 
for a central bank invested in the defaulted 
company (see also Section 5). However, since 
the latter is not standard output from any of the 
systems used, participants had to recourse to ad 
hoc solutions for computing this statistic, and 
the numbers should be treated with care.
4.2  SIMULATION RESULTS FOR PORTFOLIO I 
USING THE COMMON SET OF PARAMETERS
The first simulations were conducted on the 
basis of a common set of parameters. The 
results provide a starting point for the scenario 
analysis in Section 4.4 and can also be used to 
spot differences in modelling assumptions for 
parameters not prescribed by the parameter set, 
in particular short horizon PDs. The common 
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set includes a fixed recovery rate (40%) and a 
uniform asset correlation (24%). The credit 
migration matrix (Table 2) was obtained from 
Bucay and Rosen (1999) and is based on S&P 
ratings, but with default probabilities for AAA 
and AA revised upwards (from 0) as in 
Ramaswamy (2004, AA set equal to AA–). 
Spreads were derived from Nelson-Siegel 
curves (Nelson and Siegel, 1987), where the 
zero-coupon rate r(t) for maturity t (in months) 















1 . The curve 
parameters are shown in Table 3.
Note that under this common scenario set, 
individual assumptions were still needed for a 
number of parameters. The list includes the 
computation of the mark to market gain/loss 
in the event of a rating migration (linear 
approximation using the modified duration 
versus full revaluation), the number of 
simulation runs and whether or not to use 
variance reduction techniques. A key parameter 
left to the participants was how to apply annual 
default probabilities to short duration positions 
(mainly deposits).
Table 4 displays the simulation results, 
expressed as a percentage of market value, for 
Portfolio I, based on the common set of 
parameters. For each confidence level, the 
highest VaR and ES are displayed in italics.
The starting point for the analysis of Table 4 is 
the validation of the models, using an analytical 
approximation for expected loss. Recall from 
Section 3.3 that not every participant uses the 
same definition of expected loss. In absolute 
terms, all participants reported similar expected 
losses (i.e. very close to 0). Ignoring, for 
simplicity, time decay, it is easy to validate 
these results analytically. Approximately 80% 
of the portfolio is rated AAA, 17% has a rating 
of AA and the remaining 3% is rated A. If one 
multiplies these weights by the PDs (1, 4 and 
10 basis points, respectively) and the loss given 
default (i.e. one minus recovery rate), then the 
expected loss in default mode and assuming a 
one-year maturity of deposits would be (0.80 × 
0.0001 + 0.17 × 0.0004 + 0.03 × 0.0010) × 0.6 
= 1.1 basis points. In migration mode, the 
expected loss would be somewhat higher, but 
Table 2 Common migration matrix (one-year migration probabilities)
(percentages)
Source: Bucay and Rosen (1999), PD for AAA and AA adjusted as in Ramaswamy (2004).
To
From
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC/C D
AAA 90.79 8.30 0.70 0.10 0.10 - - 0.01
AA 0.70 90.76 7.70 0.60 0.10 0.10 - 0.04
A 0.10 2.40 91.30 5.20 0.70 0.20 - 0.10
BBB - 0.30 5.90 87.40 5.00 1.10 0.10 0.20
BB - 0.10 0.60 7.70 81.20 8.40 1.00 1.00
B - 0.10 0.20 0.50 6.90 83.50 3.90 4.90
CCC/C 0.20 - 0.40 1.20 2.70 11.70 64.50 19.30
D - - - - - - - 100.00
4 SIMULATION 
EXERCISE
Table 3 Parameters for Nelson-Siegel curves
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC/C
λ 0.0600 0.0600 0.0600 0.0600 0.0600 0.0600 0.0600
β1 (level) 0.0660 0.0663 0.0685 0.0718 0.0880 0.1015 0.1200
β2 (slope) -0.0176 -0.0142 -0.0149 -0.0158 -0.0242 -0.0254 -0.0274
β3 (curvature) -0.0038 -0.0052 -0.0061 -0.0069 -0.0139 -0.0130 -0.008024
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more relevant here is the conversion of one-
year default probabilities into one-month 
probabilities. Different conversion techniques 
explain most of the differences in expected 
losses across participants. CB4 estimated the 
highest expected loss, consistent with the most 
conservative assumption for short-term deposits 
(see Section 3.2.1 and Table 1).
An even stronger impact of this parameter is on 
the probability of at least one default, where the 
range of outcomes is much wider between, on 
the one hand, CB3 and, on the other hand, CB4 
and CB5. Computing the probability of at least 
one default analytically is complicated if 
correlation is taken into account, but a crude 
first approximation can be found when the 
simplifying assumption is made that defaults 
are independent. The portfolio consists of six 
obligors rated AAA, 22 with a AA rating and 
eight which have a rating equal to A. The 
probability of at least one default equals one 
minus the probability of no defaults. If, as a 
starting point, the assumption is made that the 
maturity of all assets exceeds the holding period 
of one year, then it is easy to see that the 
probability of at least one default should be 
equal to 1 – (1 – 0.01%)6 × (1 – 0.04%)22 × (1 
– 0.10%)8 = 1.73%, i.e. reasonably close to the 
results of CB4 and CB5. However, all 30 AA 
and A obligors represent one-month deposits, 
and so do two of the six AAA obligors. If the 
assumed PD over a one-month period is only 
1/12th of the annual probability, then the 
probability of at least one default is reduced to 
1 – (1 – 0.01%)4 × (1 – 0.01% / 12)2 × (1 – 
0.04% / 12)22 × (1 – 0.10% / 12)8 = 0.18% only, 
equal to the result reported by CB3.
The calculations in the previous paragraph are 
based on assumed default independence. The 
impact of correlation is rather complex and 
crucially depends on whether the correlation 
model deals with asset correlation (as is 
typically the case) or default correlation. Since 
the computations above are concerned with 
default only, it is useful to discuss the impact of 
default correlation. Consider a very simple 
although rather extreme example of a portfolio 
composed of two issuers, A and B, each with a 
PD equal to 50%.14 If the two issuers default 
independently, then the probability of at least 
one default equals 1 – (1 – 50%)2 = 75%. If, 
however, defaults are perfectly correlated, then 
the portfolio behavesas a single bond and the 
probability of at least one default is simply 
equal to 50%. On the other hand, if there is 
perfect negative correlation of defaults, then if 
one issuer defaults, the other does not, and vice 
versa. Either A or B defaults and the probability 
of at least one default equals 100%. Table 5 
summarises these results, which show that the 
probability of at least one default decreases as 
the default correlation increases. Note that 
these findings correspond to a well-known 
result in structured finance, whereby the holder 
14  This rather extreme PD is chosen for illustration purposes only, 
because perfect negative correlation is only possible with a PD 
equal to 50%. The conclusions are still valid with other PDs, but 
the example would be more complex. See also Lucas (2004).
Table 4 Simulation results for Portfolio I, using common set of parameters
(percentages)
 CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5
Expected loss 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
Unexpected loss 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.27
VaR 99.00 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.37 0.26
99.90 0.57 0.43 0.51 1.21 1.35
99.99 17.52 17.03 18.57 21.98  12.97
ES 99.00 0.69 0.55 0.61 1.18 1.08
99.90 4.39 4.27 4.72 5.68 4.98
99.99 22.42 21.87 21.74 22.15  21.59
Probability at least 1 default 0.18 1.64 1.4725
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of the equity tranche of an asset pool, who 
suffers from the first default(s), is said to be 
“long correlation”. Given the complexity of the 
computations with multiple issuers, it suffices 
to conclude that one should expect simulated 
probabilities of at least one default to be 
somewhat lower than the analytical equivalents 
based on zero correlation, but that, more 
importantly, the assumptions for short duration 
assets can have a dramatic impact on this 
probability.
It is instructive to analyse what proportion of 
expected losses (or any other simulation result) 
is due to default and how much is due to 
migration (downgrades). This is not standard 
output from any of the models, but two 
participants ran their simulations in default (as 
well as migration) mode. The results reported 
by one of them were obtained with the same 
system (CreditManager®) and the same 
parameters, except that migration probabilities 
other than migration to default were set to 0 and 
the probabilities of ratings remaining unchanged 
were increased accordingly. Hence, these 
results can be used to isolate the contribution of 
default to the total loss. On the other hand, the 
default and migration mode results reported by 
the other participant were computed with two 
different models and can therefore not be used 
to decompose simulation results. Instead, these 
results are presented in Section 4.4 on sensitivity 
analyses.
The result of the decomposition is displayed in 
Table 6 below. Note that expected losses due to 
defaults are three times larger than expected 
losses due to migration, even for a high-quality 
portfolio such as Portfolio I. This result 
confirms that in this case the analytical 
validation of expected loss based on defaults 
only is sufficiently accurate as a first 
approximation. Note also that at lower 
confidence levels, migration is an important 
source of risk, but that default becomes more 
relevant as the confidence level is increased. At 
99.99%, virtually all the risk comes from 
default.
From Table 4, a number of further interesting 
observations can be made. One of the first 
things that can be seen is that the VaR and, to a 
lesser extent, ES are well contained until the 
99.90% level, but that these risk measures 
increase dramatically when the confidence 
level is raised to 99.99% (which corresponds to 
the assumed probability of survival (non-
default) of AAA-rated instruments, i.e. the 
majority of the portfolio). Evaluated at the 
99.90% confidence level, the CreditVaR is 
almost irrelevant when compared with the VaR 
for market risks (in particular currency and 
gold price risks). However, once the confidence 
level is raised to 99.99%, credit risk becomes a 
significant source of risk too. With 0.01% 
probability, potential losses as measured by the 
VaR are estimated in the region of 20%. As 
confirmed by the results in Table 6, defaults 
have a significant impact on portfolio returns at 
this confidence level.
Table 5 Probability of at least one 
default for a hypothetical portfolio 
(two issuers, each with PD = 50%)
Default correlation Probability of at least 
one default (percentages)
-1 100
  0   7 5
  1   5 0
Table 6 Decomposition of simulation results 
into default and migration
(percentages)
 Default Migration
Expected loss 75.6 24.4
Unexpected loss 99.7 0.3
VaR 99.00 - 1) 100.0
99.90 45.6 54.4
99.99 99.8 0.2
ES 99.00 77.0 23.0
99.90 98.6 1.4
99.99 99.5 0.5
1) At 99%, there are no defaults. Recall that VaR has been 
defined as the tail loss exceeding expected losses. As a 
consequence, the model in default mode reports a negative VaR 
(i.e. a gain offsetting expected loss) at 99%. For illustration, this 
result is shown in the table as a 0% contribution from default 
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VaR and ES estimates reported by individual 
task force members are of the same order of 
magnitude. To some extent, this may not be 
surprising, as the participants use similar or even 
identical systems. Note that the methodology for 
scaling default probabilities, which has a 
relatively large impact on expected losses, barely 
affects tail measures such as VaR and ES, because 
the portfolio weight of short maturity deposits is 
relatively small, and the tails of the return 
distribution are largely determined by defaults 
of large issuers. Note also that the similarity of 
simulation results rises with the confidence 
level. For instance, the ratio of the highest to the 
lowest ES at the 99.99% confidence level is only 
1.04, whereas the same statistic is 2.16 at the 
99.00% confidence level. A similar observation 
can be made for the VaR. While this may seem 
counterintuitive at first sight, in reality it is not, 
because the maximum loss is bounded by the 
default of all issuers in the portfolio. The 
portfolio is concentrated in a limited number of 
issuers, and the three largest issuers comprise 
nearly 80% of the portfolio. As the confidence 
level is increased, defaults (and downgrades) 
accumulate, and this result is found by every 
system. In the limit (confidence level approaches 
100%), all issuers have defaulted. At lower 
confidence levels, the (random) inclusion or 
exclusion of defaults (or downgrades, which 
contribute most to the overall VaR and ES at 
these levels) has a large impact on the simulated 
credit risk measures.
A plot of the cumulative return distribution 
sheds more light on these results. Chart 8 shows 
the return distributions derived from the 
simulations with the largest disparity of the 
99.99% VaR, reported by CB4 and CB5. The 
return distributions are very similar, and yet, 
because defaults and rating migrations are 
discrete events, the two lines happen to cross 
the 0.01% probability (corresponding to the 
99.99% confidence level) at very different 
return levels. At 99.99%, CB4 reports the 
highest VaR, but at 99.995% for instance, the 
order of magnitude is reversed. This example 
illustrates the importance of using the full 
return distribution.
In order to determine the statistical significance 
of (differences in) simulation results, one 
participant reported confidence bounds for the 
VaR estimates, based on standard 
CreditManager® output. The confidence bounds 
are based on the observation that the number of 
scenarios with losses exceeding the VaR is a 
random variable which follows a binomial 
distribution with mean n(1 – α), where n equals 
the number of draws in the simulation and α 
corresponds to the confidence level of the VaR. 
For example, if the 99.99% VaR is estimated 
from 100,000 simulations, then the expected 
number of scenarios with losses exceeding this 
VaR is 100,000 × (1 – 0.9999) = 10. A binomial 
distribution with mean n(1 – α) has a standard 
deviation of  nαα 1− () . CreditManager® 
computes this standard deviation and finds the 
corresponding simulation results above and 
below the VaR (using interpolation when the 
standard deviation is not an integer number). 
The difference between the upper and lower 
bound, expressed as a percentage of the VaR 
and divided by 2, is reported. For a very large 
sample, it is reasonable to approximate the 
distribution of the number of losses exceeding 
the VaR by a normal distribution, and conclude 
there is a 68% probability that the “true” VaR 
will fall within one standard deviation around 
the estimated VaR. Note that the standard 
deviation of the binomial distribution increases 
Chart 8 Simulated tails of return 
distribution for Portfolio I (losses > 5% of 
portfolio only)
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deviation of the binomial distribution increases 
with the number of simulations n, but that this 
value represents only the index of observations. 
As the number of simulations increases, 
individual simulation results are less dispersed. 
As a result, the standard deviation of the VaR is 
expected to decrease.
The reported confidence bounds indicate that 
the estimates of the 99.00% and 99.90% VaR 
are very accurate. After 100,000 simulations, 
the reported standard deviation, rounded to the 
nearest percentage is 0%. However, the 
uncertainty surrounding the VaR increases 
dramatically as the confidence level rises to 
99.99%: one standard deviation equals 24% of 
the VaR. Not surprisingly, given the lack of 
data, simulation results at very high confidence 
levels should be treated with care, even though 
many participants find similar results. The 
dispersion of simulation results is also displayed 
graphically in Chart 9.
4.3  SIMULATION RESULTS FOR PORTFOLIO II 
USING THE COMMON SET OF PARAMETERS
Portfolio II was designed in such a way as to 
reflect a portfolio for which credit risk is more 
relevant than for Portfolio I. It is therefore to be 
expected that risks are higher than in the 
previous section (see also Chart 7). In this 
section, the portfolio is analysed using again 
the common set of parameters. Note that the 
proportion of assets with a maturity of less than 
one year is smaller than for Portfolio I. At the 
same time, the average maturity of these assets 
is more than one month (which was the assumed 
maturity of deposits in Portfolio I). The 
conversion of annual default probabilities into 
probabilities for shorter horizons is therefore 
less relevant here.
The simulation results are shown in Table 7 
and Chart 10. Many of the observations 
from the previous section can also be made for 
Portfolio II. There is consensus over the 
probability of at least one default among those 
who reported it. The simulations all show that 
the probability is around 12%. The consensus is 
the consequence of the small number of short 
duration assets. It is not difficult to verify the 
consensus level analytically. The portfolio 
contains 62 issuers with an average PD equal to 
0.22% (found by linear interpolation for 
notches). If, for presentational convenience, 
this average (rather than individual default 
probabilities for each rating) is used and 
defaults are assumed to be independent, then 
the estimated probability of at least one default 
is approximately equal to 1 – (1 – 0.22%)62 = 
12.8%. Again, the “true” probability is slightly 
different, because defaults are correlated and 
because averages were used.
Chart 9 Dispersion of simulation results for Portfolio I
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Next, consider expected losses. The average 
reported expected loss is around 20 basis points. 
CB1, CB2, CB3 and CB4 are all reasonably 
close to this average; CB5 is an outlier. Still, all 
systems find similar tail measures, suggesting 
that the differences may not be due to 
computational errors, but to differences in 
definition (see Section 3.3). It appears that the 
analytical approximation based on defaults 
only that was used in the previous section is not 
as good for Portfolio II, because migration risk 
is more relevant (see below). Simply multiplying 
the proportion of the portfolio in each rating by 
the corresponding PD and adding up the results 
gives an expected loss due to default of 10 basis 
points only. A more accurate approximation, 
still using a simplifying assumption (ratings 
migrate instantaneously) and using a linear 
approximation of price changes (i.e. using 
modified duration), shows that the expected 
loss would be around 22 basis points, which 
validates most simulation results.
Table 8 provides a decomposition of simulation 
results into default and migration. The table 
shows that default represents less than 50% of 
the overall expected loss. The proportion is 
much lower than for Portfolio I (almost 75%), 
mainly because the duration of Portfolio II is 
substantially higher. In addition, credit spreads 
between A (average rating of Portfolio II) and 
BBB are somewhat larger than between AAA 
(bulk of portfolio I) and AA. Note also that 
even at 99.99%, the contribution of migration 
to VaR and ES is non-negligible.
As before, there is more agreement on VaR and 
ES at the 99.99% level than at lower confidence 
levels. Moreover, the simulation results appear 
to be more precise than for Portfolio I. The 
reported confidence bound (one standard 
deviation) around the 99.99% VaR was ±1% 
only, which indicates that the loss distribution 
of Portfolio II is much smoother.
The most surprising observation is, however, 
that while VaR and ES are higher than for 
Portfolio I at the 99.00% and 99.90% confidence 
levels (as expected), the numbers are actually 
lower at the 99.99% confidence level. It turns 
out that the explanation is the same as that given 
for the steep rise in VaR and ES at the 99.99% 
confidence level for Portfolio I: concentration. 
At very high confidence levels, credit risk is not 
driven by average ratings or credit quality, but 
by concentration. Even with low probabilities of 
Table 7 Simulation results for Portfolio II, using common set of parameters
(percentages)
 CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5
Expected loss 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.33
Unexpected loss 0.60 0.73 0.60 0.61 0.79
VaR 99.00 2.20 2.72 2.18 2.72 3.85
99.90 8.52 7.95 8.61 8.08 7.64
99.99 11.24 11.55 11.24 11.36 10.74
ES 99.00 4.02 5.10 3.96 4.48 5.03
99.90 9.66 9.59 9.68 9.45 8.86
99.99 12.97 13.99 12.99 13.08 12.08
Probability at least 1 default 11.89 12.13 12.70
Table 8 Decomposition of simulation results 
into default and migration
(percentages)
 Default Migration
Expected loss 47.6 52.4
Unexpected loss 77.9 22.1
VaR 99.00 83.9 16.1
99.90 97.0 3.0
99.99 91.1 8.9
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default, at certain confidence levels defaults 
will happen, and when they do, the impact is 
more severe if the obligor has a large weight in 
the portfolio. Since Portfolio I is more 
concentrated in terms of the number as well as 
share of individual obligors, its VaR and ES can 
indeed be higher than the risk of a portfolio with 
lower average ratings, such as Portfolio II. In 
other words, a high credit quality portfolio is 
not necessarily the least risky. Diversification 
matters, in particular at high confidence levels. 
This result is also discussed in Mausser and 
Rosen (2007).
Chart 11 compares the concentration of 
Portfolios I and II. Lorenz curves plot the 
cumulative proportion of assets as a function of 
the cumulative proportion of obligors. An 
equally weighted portfolio is represented by a 
straight diagonal line (note that such a portfolio 
may still be poorly diversified, as the obligors 
could all be concentrated in one sector, for 
instance); at the other extreme, a portfolio 
concentrated in a single obligor is represented 
by a horizontal line followed by an almost 
vertical line. The greater the disparity between 
the curve and the diagonal, the more the 
portfolio is concentrated. Chart 11 confirms 
that Portfolio I is indeed more concentrated 
than Portfolio II (although the latter also 
displays a fairly high degree of concentration).
Note that the relative size of individual obligors 
does not affect the probability of at least one 
default, which is much higher for Portfolio II 
than for Portfolio I and rises to a level that may 
concern investors who fear reputational 
consequences from a default in their portfolio. 
Statistically, this result is trivial: the larger the 
number of (independent) issuers in the portfolio, 
the larger the probability that at least one 
of them will default. Mathematically, the 
probability of at least one default in a portfolio 
of n independent obligors, each with identical 
default probability pd, equals 1 – (1 – pd)n. For 
Chart 10 Dispersion of simulation results for Portfolio II 
























Chart 11 Lorenz curves for Portfolios I 
and II
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small  n and pd, this probability can be 
approximated by n × pd, and so rises almost 
linearly with the number of independent 
obligors. Clearly, increasing the number of 
independent obligors improves the 
diversification of the portfolio, reducing VaR 
and ES. It follows that financial risks (as 
measured by the VaR and ES) and reputational 
consequences (if these are related to the 
probability of at least one default) move in 
opposite directions as the number of obligors 
rises.
4.4  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS USING INDIVIDUAL 
SETS OF PARAMETERS
Simulations for Portfolios I and II were repeated 
with one or more alternative sets of parameters, 
chosen by the participants in the simulation 
exercise. The following alternative settings 
were used:
– Government bonds excluded from the 
computations, as these are perceived to be 
credit risk-free.
–  Alternative recovery rates and/or asset 
correlations. These were either fixed at 
different levels, or simulated, using a 
stochastic model for the recovery rate. In 
addition, an alternative correlation matrix 
for Portfolio II was proposed, which was 
used by some participants as the basis 
for their alternative scenarios (also for 
Portfolio I). This correlation matrix was 
obtained from one of the rating agencies 
and has, for Portfolio II, on average 
substantially lower correlations than the 
Table 9 Relative changes in VaR and ES from alternative parameter sets for Portfolio I
(percentages)
CB1 CB2
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 1 Alternative 2
∆ VaR  99.00 - -94.74 -89.47 -0.11 -43.00
99.90 +8.77 -85.96 -87.72 -3.34 -83.95
99.99 +7.08 -95.61 -94.86 -61.55 -99.47
∆ ES 99.00 +5.80 -85.51 -86.96 -29.96 -89.38
99.90 +7.06 -83.83 -85.65 -43.00 -97.71
99.99 +0.80 -83.01 -84.26 -31.21 -99.59
Parameter 
changes
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uniform correlation in the common 
parameter set.
–  Different migration matrices. A special form 
of these is the use of default rather than 
migration mode.
–  Other sources for yield curves and spreads.
Some participants chose to run several alternative 
scenarios. Each of these is shown in Table 9 
below, which displays the relative changes in the 
tail measures VaR and ES for Portfolio I as a 
result of the parameter change. Empty cells 
indicate that a parameter was left unchanged. As 
expected, VaR and ES decrease when the 
simulation is run in default mode. However, they 
fall even further in many of the other alternative 
simulations. Whenever more than one alternative 
scenario is shown, the largest impact on each risk 
measure is shown in italics. 
The simulations with the largest impact on (i.e. 
the largest reduction of) VaR and ES all have 
one thing in common: the assumption that 
government bonds bear no credit risk and can 
therefore be excluded from the analysis. Once 
these have been excluded, other parameter 
variations are of secondary importance, 
although increasing the recovery rate – in 
particular almost doubling it for deposits (CB3) 
– obviously matters. The impact of changes in 
correlations is relatively small, unless they are 
changed dramatically.
It is recalled that the migration matrix used in 
the common scenarios was based on empirical 
rating migrations from S&P, but with the PD for 
CB2 CB3 CB4
Alternative 3 Alternative 4 Alternative 5 Alternative 6 Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 1
-43.00 -38.48 -20.35 +142.60 +40.67 +25.50 -49.46
-83.95 -74.44 -56.98 -52.12 -38.24 -51.07 -25.02
-99.47 -98.89 -98.37 -98.15 -46.79 -89.76 -33.83
-89.25 -85.44 -77.70 -71.17 -26.63 -54.99 -19.73
-97.70 -96.04 -93.51 -94.09 -29.48 -66.74 -9.65




matrix from other 
rating agency
Migration matrix 
from other rating 
agency
Migration matrix 
from other rating 
agency
Migration matrix 
is mix of three 
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Migration matrix 


















factor model, but 
ﬁ  xed for certain 
issuers (on average 
higher correlations)
CreditMetrics™ 
factor model, but 
ﬁ  xed for certain 
issuers (on average 
higher correlations)
Based on studies 
by Altman and 
Kishore (97) for 
bonds and Asarnow 
and Edwards (95) 
for deposits
Based on studies 
by Altman and 
Kishore (97) for 
bonds and Asarnow 
and Edwards (95) 
for deposits
Based on studies 
by Altman and 
Kishore (97) for 
bonds and Asarnow 
and Edwards (95) 
for deposits
Based on studies 
by Altman and 
Kishore (97) for 
bonds and Asarnow 
and Edwards (95) 
for deposits
48% for bonds, 
71% for deposits
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AAA and AA issuers increased manually – one 
could argue arbitrarily – from 0 to 1 and 4 basis 
points per annum respectively (and the 
probability of the rating remaining unchanged 
reduced by the same amount). The sensitivity 
analysis in this section clearly demonstrates the 
impact of this rather subjective choice.
The sensitivity analysis is repeated in Table 10 
for Portfolio II. The impact of alternative 
parameter sets is much smaller than on 
Portfolio I. Two participants report increases as 
well as decreases in the VaR and ES, depending 
on the confidence level applied. Since there are 
multiple changes in the parameters – stochastic 
recovery rates and a different migration matrix 
among other things – it is not a priori clear 
which parameter change dominates at which 
confidence level, or why.
The largest changes (although not at the 99.99% 
confidence level) are reported by CB1, which 
has excluded the few (nine) government bonds 
from the simulation. Equally important, in this 
case, is that the recovery rate was increased 
from 40% to 0.50%. Overall though, the 
relatively small changes in Table 10 reflect 
the minor share of government bonds in 
Portfolio II and the limited impact of alternative 
PD assumptions for these issuers. Indirectly, 
this confirms the earlier conclusions.
Table 10 Relative changes in VaR and ES from alternative parameter sets for Portfolio II
CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4 CB5
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 1 Alternative 1 Alternative 1
∆ VaR  99.00 -13.64 -17.27 -39.55 -16.53 -17.31 +7.63 -24.26 -0.39
99.90 -20.07 -17.84 -44.84 -6.24 +2.07 -28.77 -2.35 -16.66
99.99 -17.88 -16.73 -1.69 -20.38 +18.11 +16.63 -12.41 -19.63
∆ ES 99.00 -23.38 -16.92 -30.85 -16.20 -12.09 +1.59 -17.63 -7.12
99.90 -14.29 -17.18 -21.84 -16.05 +7.61 -0.66 -9.74 -7.78
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5  CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Credit risk modelling will gain in importance 
within the central banking community. From 
surveys of central bank reserves management 
practices that are published regularly, it is clear 
that many central banks are expanding into 
non-traditional assets, often implying more 
credit risk taking. Still, central banks are likely 
to remain conservative investors (as they 
should) and their overall portfolio risks are 
unlikely to increase much (indeed, measured in 
terms of standard deviation of returns, the risk 
may even be reduced as a result of better 
diversification). Nevertheless, the special 
characteristics of credit return distributions 
warrant the acquisition of expertise in credit 
risk modelling and suggest that systems be put 
in place to measure credit risk. An increasing 
number of the NCBs represented in the task 
force are using portfolio credit risk models. 
These models are intended to complement 
existing market risk models, which are by now 
commonplace in any central bank. Given the 
importance of credit risk models in commercial 
banks, expertise within the investment and risk 
management divisions of central banks may 
also have positive spin-offs for other areas of 
the central banks.
The task force has identified several important 
lessons that can be learned from its work, and 
in particular from the simulation exercise. 
Some of these lessons may already be known, 
as they apply to every user of a credit risk 
system; others, however, are more specific to 
central banks. The lessons are summarised one 
by one below.
Lesson 1: A portfolio credit risk model is 
recommended for central banks with credit-
risky assets.
While credit risk has traditionally been 
perceived as a minor part of the overall financial 
risks in most central bank portfolios, the 
expansion of the investment universe of central 
banks and increased awareness of concentration 
risks have gradually changed the risk 
assessment. To measure credit risks, and to 
compare them quantitatively with other types 
of central bank risk, a portfolio credit risk 
model is needed. Such models, which have 
to apply simulation techniques, can be 
developed in-house or purchased from 
external vendors. Several members of the task 
force have positive experience with the 
CreditMetrics™ methodology and/or software 
(CreditManager®). It is easy to use and 
comprehend, and seems, despite some 
limitations (some of which apply to any 
methodology, see also the other lessons below) 
and the fact that it is designed primarily for 
corporate bond portfolios, relatively well 
positioned for central bank purposes.
Yet, it should be emphasised that central banks’ 
experience with credit risk models is relatively 
limited. Models are regularly improved and 
new techniques are developed, some of which 
may be better positioned than current models 
for the specific needs of central banks. Central 
banks should closely monitor these 
developments, as well as the proliferation of 
different types of ratings (default ratings, 
recovery ratings, bank deposit ratings, support 
ratings, etc.), key parameters of the models 
discussed in this report.
Lesson 2: Measured by CreditVaR, a typical 
central bank portfolio may exhibit more 
portfolio credit risk than expected, especially 
at very high confidence levels.
Central bank reserves are predominantly 
composed of high quality assets, which should 
ensure security (and liquidity), especially in the 
event of market disruptions. A large proportion 
is invested in government bonds, with low PDs. 
One would therefore expect credit risk in a 
central bank portfolio to be very low. However, 
this need not always be the case, in particular if 
no obligor is considered default-free. As the 
comparison of Portfolios I and II demonstrates, 
credit risk at very high confidence levels is not 
determined primarily by the average rating 
level or quality of individual issuers, but by 
concentration. A portfolio with a small number 
of large issuers may have a very high CreditVaR, 
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course this is only true if they are assumed to 
carry at least some form of credit risk and are 
held in the portfolio even after several 
downgrades. At very high confidence levels, 
the credit risk of such portfolios may be reduced 
by replacing some of the government bonds by 
bonds from other issuers, possibly with a lower 
rating.
The choice of the confidence level is crucial. 
For a private financial institution the desired 
credit rating is one of the main determinants of 
its risk appetite, required economic capital and, 
hence, the choice of a confidence level for VaR. 
A central bank’s risk appetite depends on its 
mandate, exchange rate mechanism, balance 
sheet structure and relationship with the 
shareholder(s), among other things. Arguably, a 
central bank – with reputation as its main asset 
– should aim for high confidence levels, also in 
comparison with commercial institutions.
Lesson 3: The quality of results crucially 
depends of the quality of assumptions on 
parameters. Some of these are of particular 
relevance to central banks.
The first part of this lesson is trivial. In credit 
risk modelling, the lack of data is a problem 
shared by all market participants. Gordy (1999), 
in his comparative anatomy of credit risk 
models, concluded: “This sensitivity ought to 
be of primary concern to practitioners. It is 
difficult enough to measure expected default 
probabilities and their volatility. Capital 
decisions, however, depend on extreme tail 
percentile values of the loss distribution, which 
in turn depend on higher moments of the 
distribution of the systemic risk factors. These 
higher moments cannot be estimated with any 
precision given available data. Thus, the models 
are more likely to provide reliable measures for 
comparing the relative levels of risk in two 
portfolios than to establish authoritatively 
absolute levels of capital required for any given 
portfolio”.
Nevertheless, the task force identified two (to 
some extent related) types of parameter choice 
that are of particular relevance to central banks 
and at the same time very hard to estimate. 
These parameters are the PD for high quality 
issuers, in particular the difference between 
government and corporate issuers, and the 
application of any PD to short duration assets.
The sensitivity analyses of the simulation 
exercise reveal the impact of the treatment of 
government (and related) issuers on VaR and 
ES. Empirically, defaults of AAA or AA-rated 
issuers over a period of one year are (virtually) 
non-existent. For government issuers, these 
are rarer still, even at lower rating levels. 
Consequently, migration matrices predict a 
(close to) zero PD for these high-quality issuers, 
which may be too optimistic. In response, 
investors (including central banks) have 
typically made rather ad hoc adjustments to the 
migration matrices, whereby PDs are adjusted 
manually to ensure they are positive, in such a 
way that the ranking of ratings is still respected. 
The size of the adjustment is, however, not 
based on any empirical evidence, and may have 
a dramatic impact on the results, in particular 
for central bank portfolios dominated by high-
quality issuers. Clearly this is not totally 
satisfactory, and it raises the question whether 
other “null” migration probabilities must be 
raised as well.
The typical central bank portfolio is not only 
highly rated but also has a relatively low 
duration and a significant proportion of short 
maturity assets. Normally, the horizon for the 
credit risk analysis exceeds the maturity of 
these assets, and if one uses annual probabilities 
of default, it will be necessary to convert these 
into short-term equivalents. This can be done in 
several ways; the choice can have a significant 
impact on the calculated risk measures. In 
practice, approximations of the “true” short-
term probabilities are needed, and members of 
the task force generally use an approach that 
results in conservative PD estimates. It seems, 
however, more efficient for short horizon PDs 
to be estimated directly from ratings databases, 
rather than derived from annual PDs.35
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Lesson 4: There may sometimes be a trade-off 
between financial and reputation risk.
A central bank that invests in credit-risky bonds 
may be especially concerned with default risk, 
not necessarily for the potential loss of money, 
but for any reputational consequences should it 
become known to the outside world that the 
central bank had invested in a company that had 
defaulted. It therefore seems logical to compute 
the probability that such an event might occur, 
or even to limit this probability. From an 
investment perspective, however, as 
demonstrated in this report, the probability of 
at least one default is not a good risk measure, 
because it discourages diversification. 
Statistically, it is obvious that as the number of 
issuers in the portfolio increases, the probability 
of a default by at least one of them increases. If 
the aim were to reduce this probability, it would 
be optimal to invest only in the issuer with the 
lowest credit risk (i.e. government bonds from 
one country only). Clearly, financial risk 
management would recommend the opposite, 
and it can be concluded that if reputation risk is 
related to being involved in a corporate default, 
then there is a trade-off between financial and 
reputation risks.
The lesson is that this probability must be 
treated with care in determining the composition 
of a credit portfolio. The likelihood as well as 
the magnitude of a potential loss are relevant 
for reputation risks. A central bank more 
concerned about reputational consequences of 
a single default than about the financial 
consequences could consider buying credit 
exposure indirectly, through participation in a 
fund or the use of a derivative on an index. A 
default by one of the fund/index members 
would still have a negative impact on 
performance (albeit a small one if the fund/
index is well diversified) and buying credit 
exposure indirectly has its disadvantages, such 
as limited control over the composition of the 
fund or index. Still, a default by a fund/index 
member should not have the same reputational 
consequences as a direct involvement in a 
corporate bankruptcy. The magnitude of a 
potential loss would then be more relevant than 
the likelihood, and reputation and financial risk 
management would be more aligned.
Lesson 5: Integrated risk management is 
important.
Although central banks have idiosyncratic 
features, integrated risk management should be 
a goal for them as for any other financial 
institution. Central banks’ balance sheets and, 
hence, financial risks are largely dictated by 
their mandate. To some extent, they also reflect 
past developments. Currency and gold price 
risks can only be hedged to a limited extent, if 
at all. At the same time, external stakeholders 
demand prudent investment styles and risk 
management, and sometimes even stable 
financial results. Reducing other risks, such as 
interest rate risk or credit risk, will often have 
a small impact only, and may even increase 
overall risks. A better, but also more complicated, 
way forward therefore seems a framework of 
integrated risk management, which takes into 
account all possible risks and thus allows a 
proper modelling of diversification (into, for 
example, additional currencies or new asset 
classes) and joint optimisation techniques. This 
work is still in its early stages. However, 
modelling portfolio credit risk is clearly a first, 
crucial step in integrating the different types 
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